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In the philosophy of mind, collective intentionality characterizes the intentionality that occurs when two or more individuals undertake a task together. Examples include two individuals carrying a heavy table up a flight of stairs or dancing a tango. This phenomenon is approached from psychological and normative perspectives, among others. Prominent philosophers working in the psychological manner are Raimo Tuomela, Kaarlo Miller, John R. Searle, and Michael E. Bratman. Margaret Gilbert takes a normative approach dealing specifically with group formation. David Velleman is also concerned with how groups are formed, but his account lacks the normative element present in Gilbert. The notion that collectives are capable of forming intentions can be found, whether implicitly or explicitly, in literature going back thousands of years. For example, ancient texts such as Plato's ''Republic''〔Allen, R.E. 2006. Plato, ''The Republic''. New Haven: Yale University Press.〕 discuss the cooperative determination of laws and social order by the group composed of society as a whole. This theme was later expanded into Social Contract theory by Enlightenment-era philosophers such as Thomas Hobbes〔Shapiro, Ian. 2010. ''Leviathan: Or the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Common-Wealth Ecclesiasticall and Civill''. New Haven: Yale University Press.〕 and John Locke.〔Laslett, Peter. 1988. ''Two Treatises of Government''. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.〕 In the 20th century, the likes of Wilfrid Sellars〔Tuomela, Raimo and K. Miller. 1988. "We-Intentions," ''Philosophical Studies,'' Vol. 53, 367-389.〕 In this paper, Tuomela and Miller assert three conditions necessary for a collective intention, highlighting the importance of beliefs among the agents of the group. After citing examples that are commonly accepted as requiring more than one member to participate (carrying a table upstairs, playing tennis, toasting to a friend, conversing, etc.), they state their criteria: :A member (A) of a collective (G) we-intends to do a group action (X) if and only if: ::1) (A) intends to do his or her part of X ::2) (A) believes that accomplishing X is possible, and that all members of G intend to do their part towards accomplishing X ::3) (A) believes that all the members of G also believe that accomplishing X is possible.〔 To illustrate this idea, imagine Anne and Bob intend to carry a table (that is far too heavy for one person to carry) upstairs. In order for this action to qualify as a we-intention, Anne first needs to intend to do her part in carrying the table. Next, Anne needs to believe that carrying the table upstairs is possible, and that Bob intends to do his part in carrying. Finally, Anne needs to believe that Bob also believes that carrying the table upstairs is possible. If all of these conditions are met, then Anne and Bob have collective intentions under Tuomela and Miller’s criteria. 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Collective intentionality」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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